technologies that replicate a growing range of human capabilities. 12 Even ignoring the more fantastical predictions about AI overtaking or devouring its human originators, the prospects for job destruction are eye-opening. Robotic and digital production of goods and services, coupled with advances in AI and machine learning, is destined to take over not only the routine or repetitive tasks that make up many human jobs, but some of the more advanced and creative tasks as well. On one much-cited reckoning, nearly half of the jobs in the current economy are at risk. 13 Although some new jobs are readily foreseeable -especially skilled jobs working with machines -no large new sectors or industries yet visible on the horizon appear likely to absorb the multitudes of human workers who will no longer be needed. Within this camp, predictions range from a tsunami of job loss to a more manageable rising tide.
For some, the real threat of automation is not net destruction of jobs but growing polarization of the labor market: 14 As automation both generates huge productivity gains and destroys many decent mid-level jobs, we will see a growing economic chasm between those who produce or own the new technology, or whose high-end skills are complimented by that technology, and the masses who are stuck competing, and driving down wages, for the jobs that remain. Labor shortages in some skilled job categories will coexist with a surplus of labor and downward pressure on wages outside those categories.
The debate over automation and labor rages within and between the fields of labor economics and information technology. 15 The automation debate also cuts across political divisions. For example, economists at the Economic Policy Institute, a leftleaning think tank, reject both the job-killing story and the income-polarization story 12 See, e.g., RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE, supra note #; Ford, supra note #. 13 14 Richard Freeman, Who Owns the Robots Rules the World, IZA WORLD OF LABOR 2015:5 (2015), available at https://wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/5/pdfs/who-owns-the-robots-rules-theworld.pdf?v=1 ; TYLER COWEN, AVERAGE IS OVER: POWERING AMERICA BEYOND THE AGE OF THE GREAT STAGNATION (2013). Indeed, economists who do see a new threat from automation tend to predict a greater impact on wages than on employment. See Freeman, supra, at --. 15 Many economists disparage predictions of net job destruction as speculative and belied by historical trends; while the latter are unconvincing to those who claim that "this time is different." Empirical evidence of the impact of automation on employment to date is scarce, see Freeman, supra note --, at --, though one recent study by two leading economists found that investments in robots are associated with localized net job losses. Daron Acemoglu & Pascual Restrepo, Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets, March 17, 2017 (available at https://economics.mit.edu/files/12763 ). For some early reactions, see https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/03/28/robots_are_killing_jobs_after_all/. about automation. 16 For them, the real problem of wage stagnation stems not from technology but from globalization of trade and finance, declining union strength, and lagging enforcement of labor standards. By contrast, labor-friendly Harvard economist Richard Freeman has concluded that this time really is different, and that technology has already contributed to a historic shift in the distribution of income over the past two decades "toward robots/capital and against labor." 17 Freeman expects technology to affect wages more than employment: "The 'iron law' of the effect of robots on pay is that increased substitutability with human skills puts downward pressure on the wages of persons doing competing tasks-a pressure likely to grow in the future as technology improves the competence of robots and lowers their cost." 18 This vigorous debate is not likely to be resolved by legal scholars. Yet scholars of labor and employment law and policy cannot afford to ignore it. The law of work -the law as it exists and as we reshape it going forward -is likely to affect the speed and extent of firms' substitution of machines for human workers and of future dislocation for individuals and the society as a whole. And those dislocations in turn might call for a reconstruction of the law of work.
The question is how to approach these issues in the face of deep uncertaintyspecifically, in the face of an uncertain but significant probability that automation will produce, within a decade or two, a sizable net loss of jobs and a growing disparity in labor market outcomes. Ideally we should attempt to chart a path that that will lead in the right direction -spreading the benefits and mitigating the costs of automationwhether or not the more apocalyptic predictions prove prophetic. The challenge of automation-driven job loss might call for policy changes that are well outside the conventional boundaries of labor and employment law, as in the case of proposals for a universal basic income (UBI). 19 This article will offer some preliminary thoughts on what 16 (May 24, 2017) , http://www.epi.org/publication/the-zombie-robot-argument-lurches-on-there-is-noevidence-that-automation-leads-to-joblessness-or-inequality/ ; See also John Schmitt, Heidi Shierholz & Lawrence Mishel, Don't Blame the Robots: Assessing the Job Polarization Explanation of Growing Wage Inequality, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE (Nov. 19, 2013) , http://www.epi.org/publication/technology-inequality-dont-blame-the-robots/. 17 Freeman, supra note --. 18 Id.
Lawrence Mishel & Josh Bivens, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, The Zombie Robot Argument Lurches On: There is no Evidence that Automation Leads to Joblessness or Inequality
should be done within those boundaries, broadly conceived, in response to the prospect of automation-related job loss.
II. "This Time is Different": The Next Wave of Automation
The history of automation is the history of economic development under capitalism. Since the onset of the Industrial Revolution, machines have been replacing human labor, beginning with production of food and other basic necessities of life such as textiles and clothing, which had occupied the bulk of humanity for millennia. 20 Machines and the newly collectivized modes of production that they enabled vastly increased the efficiency of production, drove down the cost of basic consumer goods, and freed up human labor for new industries that catered to the ever-evolving appetites of a more prosperous population. 21 The great technological innovations from the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s brought leaps and bounds of improvements in people's lives and standards of living that will not be repeated. 22 Since then, change has been comparatively incremental. Automation has continued to destroy some jobs, to create others, and to generate economic growth and prosperity -widely shared during the middle of the twentieth century, but heavily skewed to the top of the income distribution since then. 23 Those who predict that the coming wave of automation will be different -less incremental and more revolutionary -point to the distinct nature of recent and emerging technology. Advances in both hard and soft forms of technology -robots and algorithms, for example -are replicating a much wider range of human capabilities, and integrating those distinct capabilities more seamlessly, than ever before. The very terms "artificial intelligence" and "machine learning" hint at what is new: Technology is acquiring and refining cognitive capabilities that had long been thought to be uniquely human, and is outpacing humans at increasingly complex tasks. Another example can be found in the adjacent field of translation. In July 2016, Jason Furman, then Chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisors, used translation as a prime example of the enduring advantages of humans over computers: "AI today can do decent translations but cannot come close to what a human can do with his or her knowledge of both languages, social and cultural context, and sense of the author's argument, emotional states, and intentions." 28 Just four months later, Google launched a new version of Google Translate that capitalized on recent advances in machine learning, and that brought a quantum leap in the quality of translations. 29 Google Translate is now a much closer rival to human translators -except that the former is free and instantaneous.
Obviously not many jobs require lip-reading or natural language translation. But the complex nature of these seemingly human skills illustrate how far technology has come in recent years, and how fast it is advancing. The examples also suggest the potential for replacing human labor: Once these systems are developed, they can be replicated 24 and deployed innumerable times at little or no marginal cost, while human lip-readers and translators must be paid by the hour.
These concerns have generated a recent spate of efforts to measure the extent of "automatability" of existing jobs. 30 A 2017 report by a team at McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), which appears to represent the current state of the art, captures both the dramatic potential for job loss and the uncertainty of its time frame and extent. 31 The MGI researchers analyzed both what current technology can do and what humans are currently paid to do, both at a fairly granular level, to determine how much human work in the current economy is capable of being automated. They looked at several major economies, but the focus here will be on the U.S. results.
On the capabilities of current technology, the MGI researchers identified 18 distinct human capabilities or skills in five broad categories -sensory perception, cognitive skills, natural language processing, social and emotional skills, and physical skills -and assessed how current technology stacks up against human performance on these dimensions. 32 Not surprisingly, technology does not perform well -though it is making progress -on social and emotional skills such as sensing others' emotional state and responding in emotionally appropriately ways. But technology already outperforms most humans on many cognitive and physical skills. 33 Obviously technology does some things, like data processing, better and faster than any human being.
Machines have gained ground on humans in a wide range of skills and capabilities. But that does not yet tell us much about how much actual human work can be automated. So the MGI researchers analyzed data on human work activities that use those capabilities to varying degrees. They broke down those human work activities into seven large categories and analyzed what percentage of the time that humans 30 Compare, e.g., Frey & Osborne, supra note # (estimating that nearly half of all jobs are at risk from automation); Melanie Arntz, Terry Gregory & Ulrich Zierahn, The Risk of Automation for Jobs in OECD Countries: A Comparative Analysis (OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 189, 2016), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migrationhealth/the-risk-of-automation-for-jobs-in-oecd-countries_5jlz9h56dvq7-en (estimating that an average of 9 percent of jobs in the OECD are at risk). The OECD study criticizes Frey & Osborne for overestimating automatability by failing to disaggregate occupations; but it appears to underestimate automatability by focusing on automatable jobs, and discounting firms' ability to consolidate non-automatable tasks into a smaller number of jobs.
31 MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, A FUTURE THAT WORKS: AUTOMATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTIVITY (MGI Report), at vi (available at http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/digitaldisruption/harnessing-automation-for-a-future-that-works).
32 Id. at 35, exhibit 3. 33 Id. at 1, 3, 10, 23-24 exhibit 1, 26, 35 exhibit 3. The researchers conclude that machines can match or surpass human capabilities including "information retrieval, gross motor skills, and optimization." Id. at 10. spend in each of those activities is capable of being automated "by adapting currently demonstrated technology." 34 Least automatable are management of people (9%); application of expertise to decision making, planning, and creative tasks (18%); interacting with customers, suppliers, or the public (20%); and unpredictable physical activities (26%); much more automatable are collection of data (64%); processing of data (69%); and predictable physical activities (81%). 35 Because the mix of workers' activities obviously varies by sector and by occupation, so does automatability. The MGI researchers estimate that, at one end of the spectrum, work in the accommodation and food services sector is 73 percent automatable -that is, 73 percent of the time for which humans are now paid in that sector is spent in activities that could be automated with existing technology. By comparison, work in the health care and social assistance sector is just 36 percent automatable. (Readers employed in higher education will be happy to hear that "educational services" is the least automatable large sector at 27 percent.) 36 At the finer level of occupations, the work of both sewing machine operators and graders of agricultural products is nearly 100 percent automatable, while that of psychiatrists and legislators is less than 10 percent automatable. 37 But it is not just professional jobs that are insulated from automation. Some low-wage jobs are hard to automate because they involve unpredictable physical labor (janitors, landscape workers, and domestic workers, for example) or social and emotional skills (child care or elder care workers, for example); but pay remains low because those skills are far from scarce in the labor force.
Putting these data sets together, the MGI researchers estimated that about half of all paid working hours in the U.S. economy are spent in the three most automatable categories of work activities (collection and processing of data and predictable physical activities). All in all, they estimate that 46 percent of all of the time for which people are now paid in the U.S. economy is spent in activities that could be automated based on currently available technology. 38 Let us pause to absorb that overall estimate: Nearly half of all paid human work in the current U.S. economy could be done by existing robots or algorithms or the like. And that is based only on "currently demonstrated technology." Advances in robotics, AI, and machine learning -some of which are galloping along at a pace that surprises 34 MGI Report at 42. 35 Id. Not all activities within a category are equally automatable. For example, the predictable physical activities involved in "accommodation and food services" are over 90 percent automatable, while those involved in "health care and social assistance" are only 50 to 60 percent automatable. Those who are focused on the technology itself, however, may tend to overestimate the speed of job loss. Technical automatability is only the threshold factor in firms' decisions about automation. For one thing, it is no simple task to disaggregate the automatable tasks from those that humans still do better. As David Autor puts it, "many of the tasks currently bundled into … jobs cannot readily be unbundled … without a substantial drop in quality." 39 In any case, it will take time and managerial skill to reconfigure jobs and organizations and to weather the transitions. It will also require some highly skilled workers to implement and work with the new technology; and those workers are in short supply. 40 Given the enormous challenges and uncertainty about these issues, the MGI study's models generate only broad ranges of the time it is likely to take to move from technical automatability to large-scale implementation. Those estimates run in the range of two to four decades -though the process will be faster for software innovations (which are easier and cheaper to implement) than for robots, faster for higher-wage yet still automatable jobs, and faster in higher wage countries like the United States than in India or China. 41 The MGI account identifies one large and pervasive factor in managers' decisions about automation: labor costs. Assume that an existing technology -a robot or a software solution -is technically capable of performing certain tasks for which a firm currently employs humans. The firm must then weigh the costs of acquiring, operating, and maintaining the robots (and of the necessary organizational adjustments) against the potential gains. 42 Chief among those gains is labor cost savings: How many hours of human labor could be saved, and what are the direct and indirect costs associated with that labor? Other less quantifiable gains in safety, reliability, and quality, for example, might be even greater in some cases. But labor costs are obviously crucial, and will inevitably affect the pace of automation. As a result, the most automatable jobs may not be the first to disappear. For example, while jobs in "accommodations and food services" are among the most automatable in the U.S. economy (73%), low wages in that sector tend to slow down the process of automation. 43 We will return to the relationship between labor costs and automation decisions.
The MGI study goes on to project large productivity gains from automation and contributions to economic growth in the United States and across much of the globe. 44 Those estimates depend on an explicit assumption that "human labor displaced by automation would rejoin the workforce and be as productive as it was in 2014, that is, new demand for labor will be created." 45 Indeed, it is "vital that there be new demand for labor displaced by automation" 46 Strikingly, however, the study makes no effort to identify the new demand, new sectors, or new jobs that could absorb displaced workers. There may well be no way to do so. But that colossal leap of faith stands in marked contrast to the meticulous and sophisticated analysis behind the estimates of likely job losses. There is more than a hint here of the ingrained optimism of most economists about the economic impact of technology, and faith that historical patterns of creative destruction through innovation will continue.
The MGI study's optimism about new job creation undergirds its conclusion that automation is proceeding too slowly. 47 Firms are failing to capture the efficiency gains that are already possible with existing technology, and that are necessary to drive economic growth, especially in aging societies. One thing seems clear: The firms that have the talent, agility, vision, and perhaps the ruthlessness to take greater and faster advantage of labor-saving technology, and the individuals who are capable of creating, implementing, and working effectively with that technology, will be the winners in the perpetual high-stakes tournament created by product and capital market competition and technological innovation.
It is in the nature of tournaments that the losers outnumber the winners, and this tournament will be true to form. Firms will lose out if they continue to employ people to do things that machines can do more efficiently, and if they lack the talent and organizational agility to constantly adopt and adapt to new technology. People will lose out if they fail to acquire the high-end and hard-to-automate skills that will be in greatest demand, or if they lack the resources and opportunities needed to acquire those skills, or if they crumple under the pressure of the tournament itself. There will be many fewer of the decent mid-level jobs that require merely diligent completion of mostly-routine tasks, for those are among the jobs most vulnerable to automation.
One cannot help but blanch at just how much will be required of the human beings that hope to come out on top of this tournament and the increasingly polarized economy that it is producing. They will need to be intelligent, of course, as well as highly adaptable and able to continually retrain and redeploy their talents to meet the demands of ever-changing technological innovations and dynamic market conditions. That in turn will require psychological resilience and tolerance for risk and change. Pity those who are not blessed by nature and nurture with the makings of those traits. Pity, too, those who aspire to a more balanced life -working to live rather than living to work.
If new jobs and sectors do arise to absorb displaced workers, as the MGI study and many economists expect, we will still need much better institutions for education, training, and retraining and a stronger social safety net to enable individuals to make the necessary transitions. On the other hand, if the MGI report is roughly right in its predictions about job destruction but overly optimistic in its faith-based assumption about new job creation, or especially if job destruction outpaces current predictions as advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning race forward, then we face a genuinely bleak prospect in a decade or two: As highly automatable mid-level jobs disappear, displaced workers will be competing for jobs further down the ladder -jobs that are not worth automating because wages are so low or that are hard to automate but require no special human skills. And the more rapidly these transformations play out, the more wrenching the social consequences will be. In any case, labor and employment law will play a role, for better and for worse, in these transformations.
III. How Automation Alters the Landscape of Work and Confounds Efforts to Shore Up the Fortress of Employment
The challenge that automation poses to the future of work is in many ways continuous with the more familiar challenges of "fissured" work -to use David Weil's influential formulation. In particular, both fissuring and automation, and the managerial decisions behind them, reflect similar causal forces, including the manifold costs associated with direct employment of human labor. But automation is also different in very basic ways, and confounds prevailing strategies for coping with the challenge of fissuring.
A. The Growth of Outsourcing, Off-shoring, and Platform-based Work
"Fissuring" is the now-prevalent term describing the migration of many jobs outside of and further away from the high-profit branded corporations that reign at the top of the economy. 48 Jobs that were done in the 1950s and 1960s within those large integrated firms -especially low-wage service jobs like maintenance, cleaning, security, and food services, as well as manufacturing -have been contracted out to outside firms. Some outside firms supply specialized services or components; other firms, like temporary employment agencies, supply nothing but labor; still others, like franchisees, take over all daily operations subject to standards set by the lead firm. Instead of enjoying the relatively high wages, benefits, and formal or informal job security that used to (and may still) prevail within the lead firms' "internal labor markets," many workers are now concentrated in low-wage supplier sectors. 49 Lower wages and widespread labor standards violations among suppliers in many sectors is due in part to intense cost-based competition that creates a strong incentive to cut corners. Moreover, some suppliers are, or use, or purport to use independent contractors, who are not covered by employment laws. And many contractors have little physical capital or public reputation at stake (and less to fear from either law breaking or insolvency), and no resources devoted to compliance. These conditions all contribute to the erosion of labor standards that generally accompanies the shift of work away from branded, publicly-traded lead firms. Fissuring enables lead firms to secure lower labor costs as well as a measure of insulation from the stench of the unlawful practices that may contribute to those lower costs.
As noted in the introduction, two kinds of fissuring have drawn especially anxious attention from policymakers and scholars: Off-shoring of jobs to overseas suppliers, and the splintering of jobs into "gigs" that are or purport to be outside the employment nexus. China and Uber thus both stand for larger trends in the world of work.
In their efforts to reduce production costs, many firms contract out labor-intensive tasks to low cost producers in developing countries. As a result, China's share of global manufacturing output grew from less than three percent in 1990 to nearly a quarter in 2015. 50 India, with its enormous reservoir of English language skills, has become the epicenter of outsourced information-based services. 51 The lower labor costs underlying transnational outsourcing stem partly from lower labor standards and weaker regulatory institutions and trade unions in these much poorer countries, and partly from the same factors that operate in domestic outsourcing -cost-based competition among suppliers in a concentrated low-wage, low-profit environment. Off-shoring is one "exit 49 The terms "lead firm" and "supplier" are used here as shorthand for dynamics that recur across multiple layers of the economy. A large logistics firm is a supplier for other lead firms, but it is a lead firm relative to its own suppliers. But not all lead firms are created equal. Those with a valuable consumer brand that commands a price premium (think Apple, Inc.) have both capabilities and vulnerabilities that business-to-business firms generally do not. 50 See Made in China?, THE ECONOMIST, March 12, 2015, at [page number], available at http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21646204-asias-dominance-manufacturing-willendure-will-make-development-harder-others-made. 51 India Tops 2016 Outsourcing Index, The Hindu Business Line, Jan. 12, 2016 (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/info-tech/india-tops-2016-outsourcingindex/article8097482.ece ).
option" that firms can use (or threaten) to escape collective and regulatory efforts in the advanced economies to protect workers or improve their wages or working conditions. Uber represents another kind of fissuring and another "exit option" -one that shifts work not outside the jurisdiction but outside the employment nexus. The resulting "gigs" can be seen as a kind of piecework for the service economy. 52 Some of those gigs are distributed through highly profitable digital platforms like Uber that purport to produce nothing themselves other than the software that links consumers with the services and servants they seek. Drivers, writers, artists, carpenters, care workers, web designers, fitness instructors, and therapists are among those attempting to piece together a living from a patchwork of short-term engagements, mostly as freelancers, and sometimes bidding against each other in real time through digital platforms. 53 Where the work can be done remotely -as with the microtasks posted on Amazon's Mechanical Turk 54 -the bidders may include poor workers in developing countries. Some platforms manage to combine both the exit from high-wage labor markets and the exit from employment.
Platform-based work is just one part of the larger move toward outsourcing of work to individual independent contractors without any of the responsibilities and burdens that attend the employment relationship. Those responsibilities and burdens, and the worker rights and entitlements that they represent, are not merely passed down to less visible, profitable, and capable employers down the line; they are vaporized. There are riches aplenty for the firms at the top of the ladder. And some freelancers do prosper and gain autonomy and flexibility. 55 But for many US workers and their families, the disintegration of stable and decently paid jobs into contingent work and gigs is a socioeconomic disaster in the making.
The shift of work away from large, reputation-conscious lead firms to leaner and meaner supplier firms, from full-time and long-term employment to contingent work and gigs, and from (in Katherine Stone's words) "widgets to digits," is shaking the 52 Work) , found that 20 to 30 percent of working age individuals in the US and Europe engaged in some "independent work." Of those, most said that they did so by choice, either for their primary source of income (30 percent) or for supplemental income (40 percent). The remainder said they did "independent work" out of necessity, either as their primary source of income (though they would prefer a "traditional job") (14 percent), or for supplemental income (16 percent foundations of the American social model that evolved after the New Deal. 56 More than its European counterparts, that model delivers many material requisites of a decent life -income, of course, but also retirement income and insurance for medical costs, disability, and unemployment -mainly through employment. 57 The employment relationship is also the primary locus of most protections against discrimination, retaliation against protected activities, unsafe working conditions, and excessive work hours. Outside the employment nexus, and above a minimal means-tested safety net for the poor, individuals are largely left to the tender mercies of the market, and to whatever individual bargaining power they can muster given the intersection of their skill set with changing market conditions.
B. Three Common Factors in Automation and Fissuring: Technology, Globalization, and the Costs of Employing People
Before turning to what makes automation different from fissuring, let us first take note of three common underlying forces that run through all of these developments. The first is the role of technology. Technology is obviously the essence of automation; but technology has also played a crucial role in nearly every aspect of fissuring, including outsourcing to lower wage countries and platform work, by enabling firms to get the labor inputs they need without directly supervising the workers who supply those inputs. 58 Technology enables lead firms to dis-integrate products and processes into component parts, to set precise standards and specifications, and to closely monitor performance by lower-cost and remote outside suppliers. For example, container ships and bar-coding technology made it possible to keep meticulous track of goods as they moved from a factory in Guangdong Province in China to a Walmart store in Lexington, Kentucky. 59 In effect, technology lowers the transaction costs associated with explicit contracting for goods and services, or of "buying" versus "making" necessary inputs. 60 Technology thus enables firms to buy goods and services from outside suppliers in lowcost and competitive markets, rather than producing them internally, with little sacrifice of control or quality. And it enables Uber to monitor and control drivers, to connect 56 them seamlessly with customers, and to allocate revenues, including a large share for the platform itself.
Technology is merely the means, however, not the motivation for these developments. Both fissuring and automation are driven in part by supercharged capital markets, in which billions of dollars move across the world in microseconds, and globalized product markets. 61 Firms that falter in the pursuit of cheaper means of producing goods and services risk losing both investors and market share to more efficient producers. The basic underlying dynamics of price, supply, and demand are hardwired into a market economy, though national and transnational policies have fostered the growth of transnational firms, networks, and supply chains, and have eased the movement of goods, services, and capital across national boundaries. 62 Technology has accelerated all of those movements as never before. But firms use technology to eliminate or shift jobs only when, and only because, doing so generates higher returns to capital through lower production costs or higher productivity or both.
Automation is thus part of a larger menu of options by which those with capital seek to maximize financial returns. Those who supply the technology that replaces human labor and destroys jobs -those who build the robots or design the algorithms -are responding to demand from firms that seek more profitable ways to produce other goods and services. All of these related trends -the development of far-flung supply chains, the contracting out of labor-intensive functions like maintenance and security, the large-scale franchising of food service and hospitality services, and the rise of platform-based service providers -reflect the growing ability of lead firms to secure labor inputs without directly employing people. If robots or algorithms can supply those inputs faster, more cheaply, more reliably, or with less risk, so it will be. That points to the third factor driving all these developments: the effort to avoid the costs and risks of employing human beings. For many labor scholars and advocates, it is jarring to realize the extent to which that drives trends in the organization and automation of work. Investment banker Steven Berkenfeld made the point in vivid terms at a 2015 Department of Labor (DOL) conference on the future of work:
As I talk to companies, yes, it's about labor savings, but that's just the starting point. It's also about indirect cost savings…. It's about health care liabilities, lawsuits and insurance and disabilities benefits. There is a whole management infrastructure that needs to go on top of every person that you employ; it's a multiplier effect. … 63
Worse yet, managers report that "people are a pain to manage": They have to be identified and recruited, hired & trained. They want performance reviews and promotions. They take vacations; they get sick; their kids get sick; their parents get sick; they get pregnant; they get injured on the job. Sometimes they don't get along with each other. They sue for harassment. They need all kinds of insurance and benefits. They want raises and career development, and then sometimes they quit. Then you have to start it all over again. … [People] have needs, issues, and ambitions. And perhaps most significantly from a CEO's standpoint, they do dumb things. They give bribes and kickbacks, they discriminate and harass, they expose companies to cyber-attacks, they commit acts of negligence, misconduct, and violence, and sometimes they even deliberately sabotage. They create liabilities, they damage brands and they sometimes get CEOs fired …. 64 The bottom line according to Berkenfeld brought an audible gasp from the largely laborfriendly audience at the DOL conference: The role of higher labor costs in spurring automation can come as no surprise. After all, a basic postulate of labor economics holds that increases in the cost of laborwhether due to market forces, legal mandates, or collective bargaining -tend to induce firms to substitute capital, including technology, for labor. 67 The proliferation and falling cost of labor-saving technology makes that substitution an ever more compelling option. Equally unsurprising is the proposition that some of the costs of employing humans -and thus some part of the motivation for automation (as well as fissuring) -stem from labor and employment laws. 68 Some laws add predictable direct costs, such as payroll taxes for workers' compensation and unemployment insurance, Social Security, and Medicare, which can add 20 percent or more to the cost of an entry level worker. 69 Minimum wage rates obviously affect direct labor costs at the bottom of the labor market. Overtime laws and the employer "pay or play" mandates of the Affordable Care Act may increase direct costs much further up the ladder. 70 Labor economists generally assume that these kinds of costs are largely borne by employees through lower wages -down to the point at which minimum wage laws block further wage reductions. 71 If that is so, then these laws mainly add to the cost of employing low wage workers. But employers do not necessarily share that assumption.
Other laws increase the cost of employing people in less predictable ways; they are a source of risk. Consider the bevy of laws prohibiting discrimination, harassment, or retaliation: Litigation under those laws entails both tangible and intangible costs, for example, to reputation. Employees may be on both sides of litigation, as when employees (or ex-employees) sue over other employees' misconduct, mistakes, or misjudgments for which the employer is liable. Employees can mistakenly or maliciously trigger corporate liabilities not only under employment laws but under environmental 68 Charlotte Alexander has explored some ways in which firms restructure work to avoid the costs of legal mandates -e.g., by using independent contractors or by reducing employee work hours below a minimum threshold for coverage (e.g., the Affordable Care Act imposes employer pay-or-play obligations only for employees working more than 30 hours per week Another sort of risk is posed by union organizing, strikes, and other concerted activities protected by the labor laws. Most private sector employees have the right to form a union, to engage in collective bargaining, and to join together to pressure, criticize, or boycott their employer (whether or not through a union). The direct costs stemming from the labor laws, including the cost of violating those laws, are small; but when workers exercise their rights through collective agitation, organizing, and bargaining, the costs can be substantial. Firms spend a lot of money on "union avoidance" consultants (though how much is unclear) in part to avoid those costs. 73 Labor and employment laws thus account for some part of the cost of employing humans. One might hope for countervailing productivity gains through lower turnover or higher morale; but most of the gains that accompany higher wages and benefits (according to the "efficiency wage" theory) depend on their being voluntary, and above the market equilibrium, so that they help employers recruit, retain, and motivate employees. 74 Moreover, those gains are concentrated among skilled workers whose jobs entail discretion, whereas mandatory benefits and protections have a bigger impact at the bottom of the economic ladder.
It is hardly a revelation that employment laws add to the cost of employing humans. Nor is that necessarily a reason to oppose those laws. From a societal standpoint, those laws might serve allocative efficiency by mitigating negative externalities, overcoming collective action problems, or generating public goods; or they might serve just 72 distributional ends or other overriding non-economic values. But none of those gains undercuts firms' private economic incentive to avoid or evade those laws and their costs if they can do so. And they can increasingly do so -in part through fissuring, but more completely through automation. Automation is an entirely lawful -indeed, almost unassailable -way to avoid the costs of employing people.
D. Why Automation Is Different
Automation is in one sense just another tool in the toolbox of firms seeking to reduce the costs and risks associated with in-house labor. But automation is also different. Rather than separating human workers from those who profit from their labor, automation obviates or reduces the need for human labor. Where automation is feasible and cost-effective, it offers the ultimate exit from the costs, risks, and headaches of employing people. And it confounds conventional legal strategies for protecting workers' rights and interests.
Fissuring can partially but not totally insulate lead firms from the costs, needs, demands, entitlements, and foibles of the workers who perform outsourced tasks, and from the blowback that may hit even far-away lead firms when workers suffer abuse. Robots have no human rights to be violated, and no bodies to be bruised or battered. Their treatment provokes no brand-scarring scandals like those that hit Apple when a dozen Foxconn workers committed suicide in 2010, or when others were injured in explosions or suffered nerve damage from the use of dangerous chemicals in the manufacture of iPhones and iPads. 75 Robots do not commit suicide and they do not suffer nerve damage.
Robots also do not demand higher wages or form unions or go on strike, as humans sometimes do. It was partly the high wages and benefits that American blue collar workers had fought for over many decades that drew manufacturing from the US to China. In the past three decades, however, wages in China have risen by a factor of ten. That is partly because Chinese workers have been striking for higher wages, moving a government that is anxious to avoid mass mobilization of workers to raise minimum wages and strengthen labor standards. 76 Rising wages and labor unrest in China, along with high turnover and skills shortages, have pushed some manufacturing to poorer 75 countries with cheaper labor and less regulatory will or capacity. Some manufacturing has even returned stateside, but to factories equipped with robots and 3D printers, and staffed with a relative handful of workers who are more likely to have an engineering degree than just a high school diploma. 77 And in China itself, major supplier firms are turning to robots to staff their factories. 78 There are some stubborn forces behind both rising wages and labor protections in places like China and the falling cost and growing capabilities of automation. On the former, Karl Polanyi famously observed that the spread of capitalist markets, the commodification of labor, and their harsh consequences for many citizens have historically tended to provoke a countermovement -in the form of both collective agitation and political mobilization -seeking social protection against harsh market forces and managers. 79 The countermovement to socialize and civilize markets is far from inevitable or mechanical, and it may be hobbled or stalled especially in countries without democratic political institutions. But even in authoritarian China, political leaders have found it necessary to respond to the spread of labor unrest by regulating and improving labor standards. 80 By a variety of mechanisms, wages and labor protections have some tendency to rise -albeit not indefinitely or inexorably -as capital rushes in to exploit poor workers. 81 By contrast, machines tend inexorably to get more capable and cheaper over time. 82 The falling cost and expanding capabilities of robots and algorithms stem from the mysterious but much studied dynamics of innovation: In response to firms' feverish demand for ways to lower costs and increase productivity, tech firms on the supply side race to improve the capabilities and lower the cost of the technologies that enable both fissuring and automation, and to capture the riches that flow to the winners in that race.
Recall Andrew Puzder's prediction that robots would soon take over most jobs in his and others' fast food restaurants if minimum wages continued to rise: "If you're making 77 Rothfeder, supra note #. 78 labor more expensive, and automation less expensive -this is not rocket science." 83 The first burger-flipping robots might be expensive relative to low-wage fast food workers. But as innovation races forward, the machines get cheaper and more efficient, while labor does not. At some point the up-front investment will be worthwhile, if not obligatory, for firms in a competitive market.
In short, technological innovation is outpacing evolution. That oversimplifies things, of course. But the functional capabilities of machines are rising faster and with fewer apparent natural limits than those of humans. At the same time, humans are unable, even if they were willing, to keep pace with the falling cost of machines. The organizational innovations under the rubric of fissuring, though aided by technology, are still tied to the upper bounds of human performance and the lower bounds of the cost of sustaining human beings and reproducing their labor. Automation transcends both.
E. The Confounding Implications of Automation for the Regulation of Work
So automation is different from the various forms of fissuring that have occupied so much attention from labor scholars in recent years. It is the ultimate exit from the costs and burdens of employing human labor, and from the large body of law, developed over centuries, that regulates human labor and the sometimes-complex relationships between the users and the suppliers of labor. We have no legal or policy tools for compelling firms to use humans to do things that machines can do better or cheaper or both, nor for holding firms and employers responsible for the humans whose labor they no longer need (apart from a bare-bones system of temporary unemployment compensation for those who are actually laid off).
Worse yet, to whatever extent labor and employment law adds to the cost of human labor, it inevitably tilts firms' calculus toward labor-saving technologies. 84 The effect may be modest, but it is likely to be greater at the low end of the labor market, where minimum wage levels prevent firms from shifting the cost of legal mandates onto employees through lower wages. Especially at the bottom of the labor market, raising the floor on wages, benefits, and working conditions strengthens the business case for automation of technically automatable jobs.
That surely includes at least large increases in the minimum wage. The impact of minimum wage increases on employment levels is a subject of debate among economists. As of twenty years ago, it could be said that "[m]ost economists of all ideological persuasions have long agreed that [the minimum wage] is self-defeating: it destroys jobs in the low-wage sector of the economy and thus hurts many of the people it is intended to help." 85 The much-debated Card and Kruger studies in the 1990s, 86 along with a spate of recent empirical studies, have challenged that consensus. 87 But others discount those studies and find evidence for the orthodox position. 88 That debate persists with regard to moderate increases in the minimum wage, though we could find fairly wide agreement that small increases do not matter much, and that large increases will generally lead to job losses, especially among the least skilled workers. 89 At any point along either spectrum, however -from orthodoxy to heterodoxy, and from small to large increases -the growing capabilities and falling costs of automation are bound to tilt the scales to some degree toward displacement of workers.
the point that robots can perform as well as humans or better at a lower cost, they will be irresistible to profit-seeking firms. Indeed, firms that fail to deploy those costeffective robots in a competitive product market sector may face declining market share and pressure from investors. That is Capitalism 101.
A similar dilemma plagues the prevailing legal responses to fissuring. Fissuring in all its varied forms, and especially the disintegration of jobs into gigs, tends to undermine labor standards and the employment-based social model. Faced with this very big problem, labor scholars have converged on a solution with several variations: Expand lead firms' responsibility for the wages and working conditions of the workers on whose labor they depend. Hence the proliferation of scholarship, litigation, and policy proposals aimed at combatting misclassification of employees as independent contractors and expanding the definition of "employment," including the scope of "joint employment." The aim is to shore up the employment relationship and to expand lead firms' legal responsibility for the labor standards of their suppliers' employees. 91 The strategy of expanding firms' responsibility for workers is vehemently opposed by pillars of the business community, who argue that it will squelch innovation, flexibility, and ultimately economic growth. 92 But corporations do not merely oppose these efforts; they may be able to escape them, for example, by reconfiguring their contractual relationships to avoid employer status. 93 Smart legal tests of "employment" attempt to defeat that response by ignoring the formalities that are most easily manipulated by employers, and focusing on functional issues of control (however it is exercised), integration into the firm's operations, or entrepreneurial autonomy of the worker. 94 If firms have to pay a functional price to avoid employer responsibilities, more workers will remain under the legal umbrella of employment.
The exit option of automation, however, confounds this sensible strategy of expanding the boundaries of the employment relationship. The more successful worker advocates are at holding lead firms responsible as employers for the workers who supply their labor inputs, the greater the incentive to replace workers altogether through automation if that is feasible. If McDonalds, Inc., is held to be the employer of its franchisees' employees, or if Uber is held to be the employer of its drivers, those firms are marginally more likely to turn to burger-flipping robots or self-driving vehicles. 91 See WEIL, supra note ---. 92 In the face of that opposition, the Labor Department recently revoked an Obama-era rule expanding the definition of joint employment. See Sean Higgins, Labor Department rescinds expanded 'joint employer' rule, WASH. EXAMINER, June 7, 2017. 93 From WEIL 94 See DAVIDOV, supra note --, at --.
In view of the profound challenge to the stability of "employment" in the contemporary law of work, some scholars have proposed radically reconstructing the concept of employment, 95 or creating an intermediate category between the highly regulated employment relationship and the free-wheeling domain of freedom of contract, 96 or even dismantling the distinction between employees and independent contractors altogether. 97 These proposals, too, aim to expand the responsibility of firms for the people who supply their labor inputs -to extend to them the legal costs and burdens that are conventionally tied to employment, and to extend to some "selfemployed" individuals the corresponding benefits and protections. There is much important good sense in these proposals. Like doctrinal efforts to expand the meaning of "employment," however, they cannot address the problem posed by the increasing substitutability of technology for human labor, and they risk contributing to firms' incentive to automate work.
The same problem plagues the prevailing response of worker advocates to offshoring of operations. Firms can escape many of the law-related (and other) costs of employing people by outsourcing their labor needs to lower-cost, less-regulated jurisdictions. The primary response from labor scholars and advocates has been a variation on the domestic strategy of expanding the scope of employer responsibility: the development of transnational regulatory tools -some of them "soft law," others with sharper edges -that aim to declare and enforce multinational corporations' "social responsibility" for labor conditions within their supply chains. 98 Progress has been halting, but we are very far from the days when big consumer brands could respond to reports of labor abuses in their supply chain by claiming they were "just the buyer." Automation complicates this strategy, too. The more successful global labor regulators and advocates are in holding firms politically, socially, or even legally responsible for the labor conditions of workers in their global supply chain, the greater the incentive of lead firms and their suppliers to switch to robots. Recall the rash of negative publicity about injuries to the Foxconn workers who assemble Apple's iPhones and iPads. 99 For Apple, one side benefit of Foxconn's ambitious plan to replace most of its Chinese workers with robots -starting with the most dangerous jobs -is that it will neatly sidestep future scandals of this nature.
The case illustrates the double-edged nature of automation for workers: It is enabling Foxconn to eliminate some very dangerous jobs, as well as hundreds of thousands of other grueling jobs that were said to have led to a spate of worker suicides in 2010. 100 If the displaced workers end up with better jobs at equal or better wages, this case may show innovation and creative destruction at their most virtuous. If not, it may show how efforts to hold lead firms responsible for upstream working conditions can backfire on poor workers who lack decent alternatives. There are ways out of this dilemma for societies -especially for rich societies -and we will turn to them below; but they will require political will, public resources, and policy tools beyond those that have sufficed in the past.
There is a powerful logic behind the multifaceted effort of worker advocates and labor scholars to reconnect the most profitable and capable firms at the pinnacle of the economy with the deteriorating wages and working conditions of the workers, foreign and domestic, who supply necessary labor inputs. Those lead firms have deliberately fostered and profited from the competitive dynamics that tend to erode labor standards in most supplier markets, and they are appropriately held responsible for those consequences. But this sensible response to fissuring not only fails to meet the looming though uncertain challenge of automation-based job loss; it tends to further tilt firms' calculus away from human labor and toward machines.
IV. A Way Forward in the Face of Uncertainty
Workers and their organizations and advocates have long struggled to raise labor standards, expand employee rights and benefits, and improve their enforcement. At least for present purposes, we can assume that these laws and their enforcement are beneficial to workers and the society as a whole. But to private firms, those laws entail net labor costs or risks that are worth avoiding if possible -in effect, a tax on employing human labor. Fissuring strategies enable firms to avoid or evade some of those costs, though legal efforts to extend the scope of employer responsibility aim to make that more difficult. Automation sidesteps those efforts and more completely avoids the costs of human labor, including those stemming from the law. That option becomes ever more appealing as the cost of machines falls and their capabilities rise.
All in all, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the labor costs stemming from employment laws are among the factors that lead firms to automate jobs and replace people. That conclusion might logically lead to a prescription that would be highly dispiriting to worker advocates and to many labor and employment law scholars: Whatever benefits these laws and their enforcement yield for workers and the society as a whole should be weighed against their potential impact on employment. Perhaps we should now be looking for judicious ways to unburden and perhaps even deregulate the employment relationship so as to slow down both fissuring and especially automation-related job losses.
There are reasons to resist this strategy, even apart from the basic uncertainty about the impact of automation on employment, and I will turn to them below. But first let us consider what an optimal "unburdening" strategy might look like. Let us consider whether it is possible to reduce the legal tax on employment -and thus to marginally reduce firms' incentive to replace employees with contractors and human workers with machines -without undermining the quality of work and of life for the many or the few who work for a living in the future.
A. Reconfiguring Employee Rights and Employer Mandates
The beginning of an answer to this question lies in separating the question of what entitlements workers should have from the question of where the attendant costs should fall. In some cases it makes sense to put the costs of workers' legal rights and entitlements on those who employ them, or more broadly, on those who use their labor. But in some cases it may not. My focus here is on U.S. law, but the basic strategy may apply elsewhere.
Some of the hard-won rights of workers necessarily entail duties and burdens on those who employ them. That is true, for example, of laws regulating occupational health and safety and workplace hazards. Employers control many aspects of workplace safety for their employees, and forcing them to reduce hazards and to internalize the costs of occupational injuries and disease gives them an incentive to avoid those losses. So, too, with laws prohibiting discrimination and retaliation (against whistleblowers, for example). The employing firm causes the harms addressed by these laws -both the harms to individual employees and the social harms; and forcing the firm to answer for them deters misconduct and encourages organizational precautions. Laws combatting occupational hazards, discrimination, and retaliation may well add marginally to the cost and risk of employing people, and thus to the case for automation. 101 And if there are more efficient and equally effective ways of protecting the underlying rights, then we should explore them. But the only way to uphold these crucial entitlements is to put corresponding duties and burdens on employers. 102 By contrast, some existing employment mandates bear no such logical relationship to the employment, or even to the work, and redress no harm caused by the employer. Take health insurance, for example -a fairly big-ticket item for U.S. employers. 103 Generally speaking, the employer bears no causal responsibility for the health care needs of workers or their families; and there is no deterrent logic in requiring employers to bear a portion of employees' health insurance costs, as the pay-or-play mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) indirectly tends to do. On the contrary, the ACA might counterproductively deter some employment, for employers can escape its costs by reducing employees' hours below the 30 per week threshold that triggers employee coverage, or by keeping the size of their workforce below 50, the threshold for employer coverage. 104 Either might be accomplished, without loss of output, by automating (or contracting out) some work.
Extending mandatory health benefits to independent contractors or "gig" workers (say, on a pro rata basis) would solve some problems, but not others. 105 On the one 102 Indeed, the same logic might extend beyond "employees" to others who perform work for the firm. A firm should be obliged to avoid hazardous conditions at work sites under their control even if those who are endangered are independent contractors. And a firm should be liable if it discriminates against minority or female contractors, or if it penalizes a contractor because of her disclosure of illegal activity. 103 According to the Henry Kaiser Family Foundation 2016 Employer Health Benefits Survey, "Annual premiums for employer-sponsored family health coverage reached $18,142 this year, up 3 percent from last year, with workers on average paying $5,277 towards the cost of their coverage." (http://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2016-employer-health-benefits-survey/ ) Not all of these costs are the product of legal mandates, of course. 104 Alexander, supra note #, notes this expectation. The empirical evidence on these effects is mixed. One study estimated "an increase in low-hours, involuntary part-time employment of a half-million to a million workers in retail, accommodations, and food services. 105 A proposal along these lines -though not clearly meant to be mandatory -was circulated recently. See Common ground for independent workers: Principles for delivering a stable and flexible safety net for all types of work, available at https://medium.com/the-wtf-economy/common-groundfor-independent-workers-83f3fbcf548f ("Everyone, regardless of employment classification, should have access to the option of an affordable safety net that supports them when they're injured, sick, in need of professional growth, or when it's time to retire"; and benefits should be portable, pro rata, and universal).
hand, it would extend health coverage for some who need it, and it would reduce firms' incentive to substitute freelancers for employees -both worthy objectives. But it would still tilt firms' calculus away from human labor and toward the more complete exit option of automation.
Let us be clear: An employer mandate is currently a necessary component of our jury-rigged health care system; it is much better than nothing. A broader mandate that included some independent contractors would be a net improvement. But especially in an era of accelerating automation, the perverse tax that these mandates impose on the use of human labor is another reason to pursue a universal single-payer health care system -still a long shot in the United States, though seemingly gaining support. 106 The point here that some entitlements that have historically been linked to employment should be reconceived, and their funding mechanisms reconfigured, so that they do not tax and discourage the employment of human labor. Some employer mandates usefully force employers to bear the costs of socially harmful conduct, and induce them to avoid such conduct. But others are politically expedient off-budget ways to fund social entitlements that bear no necessary relation to employment or to work. There is nothing wrong with that in principle. And it might have been sustainable in the economy of the past century, dominated as it was by vertically-integrated firms with strong internal labor markets and long-term employment relationships. 107 Through a combination of legislation and collective bargaining, employers in the United Statesmore than their counterparts in Europe -have been held responsible for most of what their employees needed to care for themselves and their dependents and to live a decent life even past retirement. 108 But in an age of shorter job tenure, rampant fissuring, and rapidly advancing automation capabilities, we need to rethink that paradigm. We need to explore better ways of delivering basic social entitlements and meeting workers' needs that do not function as a tax on the use of human labor versus machines.
Consider what that strategy suggests about minimum wage laws. Let us posit that people who work full time deserve a living wage -enough to meet their basic material needs without public assistance. Fifteen dollars per hour approximates a living wage for a single person in the most expensive cities; it is not enough for a single wage-earner to support a child even in the poorest parts of the country. 109 But a fifteen dollar minimum wage -which in much of the country would require a very large wage hike -is likely to tip the balance for some employers toward elimination of some jobs; and that is even more likely as robots get better and cheaper. Workers need a raise, but they also need jobs. So even assuming that low-income workers deserve higher incomes, does it make sense to require employers to pay a significantly higher wage? Or are there other ways to put part of that money into workers' pockets?
Indeed there are. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) subsidizes low income earners, and funds that subsidy through general revenues in the form of a "tax expenditure." Daniel Shaviro, writing twenty years ago, argued persuasively that the EITC was a better way to raise low-wage workers' incomes and to increase the returns to work than higher minimum wages -both because the subsidy is better targeted at low-income workers and because it does not tax and reduce employment. 110 Better yet, he argued, would be a "universal lump sum payment" -essentially a universal basic income -or "negative marginal tax rates" at low income levels. 111 All of these alternative strategies separate the question of what workers need or deserve from the question of what employers should have to pay, and allow us to pursue legitimate redistributive aims without a counterproductive impact on employment -an advantage that is even greater as automation becomes more cost-effective.
To the extent that firms can increasingly boost their profits by shedding workers and automating work, their complaints about the labor and employment law tax on employment may have to be taken more seriously -not as a reason to cut back on workers' entitlements but as a reason in some cases to shift the burden of funding those entitlements away from the employment nexus. If possible, that burden should be placed where it does not tax the use of human labor versus machines, and where it can tap some of the enormous wealth that is flowing to firms that are leading the drive toward automation -those that create the technology and those that are most aggressively deploying it.
These proposals raise many questions beyond the scope of this exploratory paper. Undoubtedly, efforts to broadly socialize the funding of what have heretofore been employee benefits will confront serious challenges. They will confront the problem of transnational tax arbitrage, by which firms can reduce their exposure to taxes by offshoring operations or income; and they will confront stiff political headwinds, including powerful anti-tax and anti-redistributive impulses even among some prospective beneficiaries. Clearly we should not dismantle the current system of employment-based benefits, creaky and piecemeal though it is, until a more broadly socialized system of benefits is in place. But this is a long-term battle that needs to be fought.
My argument here in some ways recalls earlier efforts to deal with the disintegration of the standard employment relationship and the rise of various forms of "selfemployment." 112 Three prominent Canadian labor law scholars nicely captured that challenge to labor and employment law:
The boundaries between labour market locations have blurred, and the binary distinction between self-employment and employment has broken down.… The challenge is not simply to remap employment in labour law, but, as Brian Langille has so nicely put it, to consider the continued viability of the contract of employment as the "platform" for delivering rights and benefits as well as imposing obligations. 113 It remains an important and unfinished project to consider which "employee" rights and benefits should be extended to others who perform work outside the employment contract. My point here, however, is that expanding "the 'platform' for delivering rights and benefits" to include self-employed workers, and expanding the responsibilities of firms accordingly, may not go far enough in an era of accelerating automation and decreasing reliance on human labor.
For much of the twentieth century, many of the entitlements of employees, of workers, and of citizens were bundled together in a concept that another Canadian labor law scholar, Harry Arthurs, called "industrial citizenship" -"an employmentrelated system of entitlements which would protect workers against arbitrary treatment by their employer and the vicissitudes of the economy, old age and illness." 114 Much as the erosion of the standard employment relationship through fissuring highlighted the need to extend many of those entitlements beyond employment, the rising capabilities and falling cost of automation are now highlighting the need to extend some of those entitlements beyond the broader category of paid work. In both cases, the goal is twopronged: both to extend crucial entitlements to those who in the past would have been, but no longer are, securely ensconced within employment relationships; and to mitigate firms' incentive to organize production so as to avoid incurring the burdens linked to those entitlements.
This article has focused mainly on the latter virtue of untying some entitlements and their costs from employment: That move would modestly reduce the relative cost of employing human labor and thus the incentive to substitute contractors for employees and machines for humans. I do not want to overstate this benefit. Having argued for a very selective recalibration of the legal burdens on employment of human labor -one that aims to preserve the requisites of decent work -I cannot claim more than an incremental reduction in firms' incentive to offload workers. But alongside that incremental benefit are two additional virtues of a broader system of universal social provision over the prevailing strategy of shoring up (and weighing down) the standard employment relationship.
One additional virtue of a more universal system of social provision is that, even while it would reduce firms' incentive to use freelancers instead of employees, it would better enable some individuals to choose the greater autonomy and flexibility of selfemployment or freelancing. It is hard to credit the rosy depictions of the so-called "sharing economy" when so many of those who work in that economy would prefer to have a real job and the relative stability and benefits that go with it. Yet freelance and platform-based work is not only a sham or a last resort for those who cannot get a fulltime job. Many individuals genuinely value the freedom from direct supervision and the ability to determine their own work schedule, and would make that choice if they had a baseline level of economic security from which to do so.
Another virtue of a stronger universal system of social provision is that it would counter the stratification of society into insiders -relatively privileged and wellprovisioned employees of leading firms -and outsiders who are left to their own devices. The prevailing strategy of doubling down on and shoring up the fortress of employment, however successful, will leave out a large and almost certainly growing segment of the adult population, along with their dependents. Detached from economically capable and relatively compliant lead firms, they may work for less profitable and compliant contractor firms, or as independent contractors or freelancers or temps, or they may be unable to find steady paid work at all. A stronger set of basic social entitlements would help to ensure that those individuals and their children will enjoy the foundations of a decent and healthy life even if they cannot get into the fortress of full-time stable employment.
B. Why Not Unburden Employment? Some Partial Counterarguments
The strategy of "unburdening" employment -even along the circumspect lines that I have proposed here -will meet sharp criticism from labor scholars and worker advocates who seek to defend and build on the existing model of worker rights and entitlements and employer responsibilities. Some of that criticism might reflect an intuitively appealing premise, explicit or implicit, that employers deserve to bear the burden of whatever rights and entitlements workers deserve to have. But to the extent that employers can lawfully escape those burdens -not just shift them elsewhere through fissuring but escape them altogether through automation -that premise seems self-defeating. Still, there are serious pragmatic arguments against any move to dismantle the existing edifice of labor and employment protections, and in favor of shoring up the fortress of employment. I will call the latter (a little tendentiously) the fortress strategy.
One defense of the fortress strategy harkens back to the economists' mantra of creative destruction: Even if high labor standards are likely to destroy some jobs, they will also help to generate new and better jobs. As Marc Linder has shown, that was the view of some New Deal proponents of early minimum wage laws: Those laws' tendency both to displace some workers and to promote more capital-intensive modes of production was viewed as a feature, not a bug, of those laws. 115 As a result, both consumer demand and displaced workers would flow toward the more efficient and modern (and capital intensive) producers who could afford to pay higher wages. 116 But if "this time is different" in terms of prospective net job losses -as new technologies close in on most of the human capabilities that both present and future product markets will require -then we have more to worry about than the New Dealers did. 117 A second argument for the fortress strategy is more fatalistic: Net job losses due to automation are inevitable, and will not be much affected by reducing the costs of employees' legal rights, benefits, and protections. Those costs obviously matter only at the margin in firms' decisions about automation; and cutting them back would only marginally slow down the loss of jobs while undermining the quality and working conditions in the jobs that remain. That makes some sense: People will not win a "race against the machines" on cost grounds, and they should not try to do so. But that neglects the implications of the fortress strategy for those left outside the fortress. Moreover, we should not imagine that the pace of automation does not matter. The faster jobs are automated, the less time people will have to acquire the skills needed in a more tech-infused economy; and the less time we will have as a society to figure out and implement the necessary legal and institutional responses to automation.
A third argument for the fortress strategy is based on the superiority of alternative public policy tools for spreading the benefits and mitigating the costs of automation: Better institutions of basic and higher education and vocational training and retraining would help to equip people for the technology-adjacent jobs that are likely to grow in the future. Public investments in infrastructure and in social services for peopleespecially young, old, and disabled people -who cannot afford to buy the care they need in the market -would both create jobs and address societal needs. 118 A program of national service -voluntary or even mandatory -would do both of those things and perhaps more. 119 And new forms of income support would enable people to weather, or even to choose, breaks or shortfalls in paid employment. 120 That might take the form of a universal basic income, or a mix of negative income taxes, earned income tax credits, expanded unemployment insurance, and a stronger and wider social safety net, including universal access to health care. 121 The notion here is that the impact of automation on employment can be countered through public investments in training and job creation, and does not require any weakening of labor standards or worker benefits. Similarly, the New Dealers who embraced the tendency of higher labor standards to destroy some jobs also urged the adoption of an "active manpower policy," including investments in "retraining and education … and public employment," so that displaced workers did not bear the burden of these shifts. 122 Clearly such measures would constitute a far more salubrious 118 On the economic and social value of public investments in caregiving and early childhood education, see http://www.georgetownpoverty.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Building-thecaring-economy_hi-res.pdf . 119 Apart from supplying valuable paid work opportunities and work experience, "a vastly expanded, even mandatory, national service program … might at once throw Americans of every creed and culture together for a year or two at an impressionable age, fire up civic engagement and even revive the 120 Much of the attention lately has focused on the idea of a universal basic income (UBI). See supra note --. 121 Richard Freeman has proposed that, in view of the seemingly abiding shift in the distribution of income away from labor and toward capital (and robots), this income support might be derived from workers' ownership of sizable chunks of technological capital. Freeman, supra note #, at ___. 122 Linder, at 158-59. Indeed, the expansion of social programs and regulatory activity since the New Deal, and the resulting growth of public employment at all levels of government, might response to automation-related net job losses than cutting back on labor standards and employee rights and entitlements. 123 But we might doubt the will and capacity of our political institutions and leaders to make those public investments, and we might doubt whether they will suffice. Either way, it might make sense to also recalibrate our approach to employment mandates and liabilities.
A fourth more limited defense of the fortress strategy recalls the economists' assumption that the cost of employer mandates generally falls on employees in the form of lower wages. Deflating though that might be for workers' allies, it does suggest that legal mandates should have little impact on employer decisions about automation. However, that assumption does not appear to correspond to employer beliefs, and it holds in any case only down to the point that the minimum wage blocks further wage cuts. It may thus be in the low-wage labor market where mandates, including minimum wage increases, are most likely to tilt firms' calculus toward automation. So the notion that employees generally bear the cost of mandates only partially mitigates concerns about spurring job loss.
Underlying these various defenses of the legal fortress of employment are conflicting predictions about the future impact of automation on jobs. That reminds us again of the uncertainties and contingencies that cloud our forecast, and is yet another reason to resist a broadly deregulatory response to fears of automation-induced job loss. Yet all of these arguments together do not wholly dispel the concern that labor and employment laws are contributing in some measure to the speed and extent of job losses. I have argued that it is possible to counter that impact while protecting workers' rights and interests, and at the same time to begin to construct a stronger and broader foundation for the more varied working lives that are likely in the labor markets of the future.
V. Conclusion
The claim that machines will make human labor obsolete is overstated, and it serves for some enthusiasts of innovation and the invisible hand as a convenient straw man, easy to ridicule and refute. But that sideshow should not divert our attention from a real risk of labor surpluses and falling wages for workers whose skills are rapidly being replicated or surpassed by hard and soft forms of technology. That is a devastating prospect for the vast majority of people in our society who depend on paid work for their livelihood and the material support of their dependents.
have offset some of the labor market slack created by automation over the past eight decades, whether or not it was intended to do so. 123 Notably, the MGI report hedges its own bullish bet on creative destruction by urging policy makers to take measures like these. MGI report at --(though it is circumspect about how the government can do that).
Much more than income is at stake. Even if we could implement a decent universal basic income, against daunting political odds, a deficit of decent work would shake the foundations of the social order. Work is central to most people's identity. And the experience of shared work fosters social interaction and social integration, solidarity and friendship, and cooperation and compromise amidst conflict. I have written elsewhere about the crucial though paradoxical role of workplace relationships in the fabric of civil society, especially in a diverse and divided society. 124 That fabric will become even more frayed, and our politics even more fraught, if a growing segment of the population finds itself in desperate competition for scarce work opportunities, or discouraged from even entering that competition. Decent work for all who want and need it -whether it is within or beyond the employment relationship -is worth fighting for.
There is a historical irony in the almost romantic attachment of some contemporary worker advocates to the standard employment relationship, with its signature features of worker dependency and managerial control. In the early decades of industrialization, skilled artisans fought to retain their autonomy, and to resist the subordination and dependency that they called "wage slavery." Eventually most workers resigned themselves to the subordinate role of employee, and fought for its reformation through an array of employee rights, minimum labor standards, and structures for collective representation -all to the end of transforming "wage slavery" into a decent way of economic life for ordinary workers. But we should not imagine that the standard employment relationship, thus civilized, is a permanent reality for most workers, much less an ideal to defend at all costs.
Through fissuring and automation, firms are increasingly finding ways to escape their end of the socially constructed deal embodied in the standard employment relationship; and a growing number of workers are either fleeing or being ejected from both the constraints and the protections of that relationship. Shoring up and expanding the fortress of employment will not prevent that exodus. We do need to improve and enforce employee rights and labor standards -those that are properly tied to employment. And we need to invest public resources in creating new jobs and better preparing people for the jobs of the future. But we also need to furnish the growing domain that lies beyond employment with the minimum basic necessities of a decent life both for those who choose a more independent economic existence and for those who cannot get into the fortress.
The prescient 1999 "Supiot Report" to the European Commission observed that "the employee subject to full-time, open-ended subordination is surely not the only model for working life. Another figure can be discerned on the horizon: a worker who can reconcile security and freedom." 125 Perhaps the real, if sometimes exaggerated, threat of automation-based job losses will supply the motivation we need to move toward a new social model -one that supports many modes of working life, and that works better for all of those who work for a living.
